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INTRODUCTION
An interesting but difficult problem in copyright law occurs when 
an individual holder of a jointly owned copyright decides to license 
the copyrighted work without the consent of her co-owners.  By and 
large, copyright law permits unilateral actions by a single joint owner, 
despite the potential consequences for other co-owners.1  One situa-
tion, however, has recently caused problems for courts and commen-
tators:  when a co-owner unilaterally resolves an act of copyright in-
fringement by a third party by retroactively licensing that infringer, 
purportedly authorizing her prior infringement. 
Examples of the scenarios that may play out in this situation can 
help illustrate the potential problem.  Suppose that two individuals, A
and B, jointly own2 a copyright in a particular song, X.3  A third party, 
C, wishes to use the copyrighted work, X, in some manner.  To that 
end, A, B, or both A and B can sell or license their interest in the work 
to C.4  Suppose first that A grants C a license to use X in some manner.  
Since C has a license in X, B, under copyright law, cannot sue C for 
1 See infra text accompanying notes 29-33 (discussing the effects of actions by one 
copyright co-owner on other co-owners). 
2 See 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2006) (“The authors of a joint work are coowners of 
copyright in the work.”). 
3 See id. § 102(a) (listing types of works that can be copyrighted). 
4 See Meredith v. Smith, 145 F.2d 620, 621 (9th Cir. 1944) (noting that co-owners 
of a copyright can grant licenses unilaterally); 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIM-
MER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 6.10[A] (2008) (“[A] joint owner may, without obtain-
ing the consent of the other joint owners . . . grant a nonexclusive license to third par-
ties.”).
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copyright infringement:  C’s license from only one of the co-owners—
in this case from A alone—is enough to immunize C from claims of 
infringement.5
Now let us suppose, however, that C does not obtain a license 
from either A or B before using X, and therefore infringes A and B’s 
copyright. A, seeking to enforce her rights in X, threatens C with a 
suit for infringement.  A and C decide to settle the infringement out 
of court, and arrange an agreement, common in the entertainment 
industry, whereby A grants C a “retroactive license” that purports to 
authorize any prior infringement of the copyright in X on C’s behalf.  
Consider what may happen next:  B, seeking to enforce her own rights 
in X, also threatens C with a suit for infringement.  The operative 
question in both this example and this Comment is whether C’s ret-
roactive license from A should extinguish B’s ability to sue C for copy-
right infringement. Only one case at the circuit court level has ad-
dressed this question, and various district courts have reached 
differing but plausible conclusions.6
This situation, though, is hardly uncommon.  Copyrights are often 
jointly owned—particularly (but not exclusively) those in musical 
works and motion pictures.  Additionally, in the fast-paced entertain-
ment industry, copyrighted works are often exploited before licenses 
to use the works are obtained or finalized, as parties often assume that 
licenses can be acquired after the fact, if necessary.7
As this Comment discusses, the absence of a clear rule on whether 
unilateral retroactive transfers can cure prior infringements can affect 
transactions involving jointly owned copyrights.  Indeed, this question 
has not only significant legal implications, but also practical impor-
tance.  Most basically, it raises questions of copyright law regarding co-
ownership, alienability of rights, and copyright’s general goals and 
5 See McKay v. CBS Inc., 324 F.2d 762, 763 (2d Cir. 1963) (“[A] license from a co-
holder of a copyright immunizes the licensee from liability to the other co-holder for 
copyright infringement.”); see also Quintanilla v. Tex. Television Inc., 139 F.3d 494, 498 
(5th Cir. 1998) (“A co-owner of a copyright cannot be liable to another co-owner for 
infringement of the copyright.” (citation omitted)). 
6 See infra Part II (discussing cases on retroactive transfers). 
7 This is seen quite often in the context of music sampling.  See, e.g., Jeffery H. 
Brown, Note, “They Don’t Make Music the Way They Used To”:  The Legal Implications of 
“Sampling” in Contemporary Music, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1941, 1953-54 (noting that record 
companies often avoid legal battles with one another over sampling disputes, prefer-
ring private prospective arrangements); Note, A New Spin on Music Sampling:  A Case for 
Fair Pay, 105 HARV. L. REV. 726, 727-28 (1992) (describing, in the sampling context, 
the prevalent use of private settlements and presumably retroactive licenses by music 
lawyers when prospective sampling licenses were not acquired). 
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aims; yet its significance extends further.  Since the co-owners of a 
jointly held copyright are to be treated generally as tenants in com-
mon,8 property law may play some role in resolving the issue, though 
the question of how great a role it ought to play is contested.9  Fur-
thermore, since the licensing copyright holder can contract away cer-
tain rights, there may also be contract law concerns. 
Beyond the legal questions there are also practical implications 
for those operating in the copyright world.  These implications can be 
seen quite clearly in the context of valuing settlements.10  As in the ex-
ample above, if C is not immunized from B’s infringement claims by 
virtue of a settlement with A, the value to C of settling with A de-
creases.  If, however, C is immunized from B’s suit, A—aware that its 
license is the only license that C needs—can extract a higher price 
from C.  Or, in the absence of a clear rule on the matter, A may ex-
tract a relatively low price, thinking that B would also be able to re-
cover damages or a settlement from C.
While the House Report accompanying the 1976 Copyright Act 
states that “[t]here is . . . no need for a specific statutory provision 
concerning the rights and duties of the coowners of a work,”11 the 
status of unilaterally granted retroactive transfers remains unresolved 
in most circuits. Accordingly, this Comment proposes a resolution to 
this question:  since granting curative power to retroactive licenses will 
encourage willful infringement, hamper predictability in copyright 
transactions, and fail to protect a copyright co-owner’s vested right to 
sue for infringement, unilateral retroactive conveyances should not 
provide immunity against infringement suits by other co-owners. 
Before elaborating on an answer, however, it is necessary to set 
forth some background.  To that end, Part I covers general substantive 
copyright law as well as the specific rules on joint ownership of copy-
rights and the general alienability of those rights.  Since the cases that 
have dealt with the question at issue here provide a valuable glimpse 
into the various approaches available to courts in considering this 
8 See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 121 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 
5736 (“Under the bill, as under the present law, coowners of a copyright would be 
treated generally as tenants in common . . . .”); 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, 
§ 6.09 (surveying copyright cases in which courts have analogized to property law). 
9 See infra Part III.B (discussing the proper role of property law in resolving this 
question). 
10 See, e.g., Henry L. Self III, Settlement of Infringement Claims, 13 TEX. INTELL. PROP.
L.J. 65, 66 (2004) (describing the value to an infringer of being able to settle with only 
one co-owner of a jointly held copyright). 
11 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 121, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5736. 
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problem, I discuss those approaches in Part II.  I then turn to a discus-
sion of the guiding goals and principles of the Copyright Act and 
other areas of law that may help in evaluating the legality and equity 
of retroactive transfers in Part III.  Lastly, in Part IV I, use these prin-
ciples to conclude that, while there are strong arguments for allowing 
unilateral retroactive transfers, the nonsettling co-owner is so disad-
vantaged that unilateral retroactive transfers should not be allowed. 
I. BACKGROUND: A PRIMER ON SUBSTANTIVE COPYRIGHT LAW
A.  Copyrights Generally 
A discussion of the basic, functional principles of copyright law 
can help illuminate the issue at hand.12  The protections of artistic 
and literary works are governed under the Copyright Act of 1976,13
the major omnibus copyright legislation that replaced the Copyright 
Act of 1909. 
Under the Copyright Act, a copyright is a bundle of discrete 
rights.14  These rights are held in “original works of authorship fixed 
in any tangible medium of expression”15 and include, among other 
rights, the rights to reproduce16 and distribute17 the work.  These 
rights are exclusive to the copyright holder or holders.18  Anyone who 
violates those exclusive rights enumerated in section 106 of the Act “is 
an infringer of the copyright or right of the author.”19  The “legal or 
beneficial owner of an exclusive right under a copyright is entitled . . . 
to institute an action for any infringement of that particular right 
committed while he or she is the owner of it.”20  This right—the right 
to sue for infringement—is also exclusive to the copyright owner,21
12 For more on the theoretical goals of copyright law, see discussion infra Part 
III.A.  To be sure, I am only providing the copyright law background necessary to un-
derstand the problem of unilateral retroactive transfers. 
13 Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.). 
14 N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 495 (2001). 
15 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006). 
16 Id. § 106(1). 
17 Id. § 106(3).  The other rights include the right to prepare derivative works and 
the right to perform or display the copyrighted work.  17 U.S.C. § 106(2), (4)–(6). 
18 Id. § 106. 
19 Id. § 501(a). 
20 Id. § 501(b). 
21 See id. (granting copyright owners the right to bring infringement suits); see also
ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 944 F.2d 971, 980 (2d Cir. 1991) 
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and “it is one of the most valuable ‘sticks’ of the ‘bundle of rights’ of 
copyright.”22
B. Joint Ownership of Copyrights 
The doctrine of joint ownership, while not explicitly addressed by 
the 1909 Copyright Act, was “firmly established by case law”23 and 
largely incorporated into the 1976 Copyright Act.24  The current Act 
expressly provides for joint ownership of a copyrightable work:  “The 
authors of a joint work are coowners of copyright in the work.”25  The 
Act defines a “joint work” as “a work prepared by two or more authors 
with the intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable 
or interdependent parts of a unitary whole.”26  Yet a “joint work” can 
also result from something more than simple joint authorship.27
Copyright co-ownership may, for example, “result from a transfer of 
copyright or from the inheritance of a copyright by two or more 
heirs.”28
All joint owners of a copyright share ownership of the work 
equally, unless a contrary agreement is made.29  According to the 
House Report accompanying the 1976 Copyright Act, this meant that 
joint owners of a copyright each have “an independent right to use o[r] 
license the use of a work, subject to a duty of accounting to the other 
(“[T]he Copyright Act does not permit copyright holders to choose third parties to 
bring suit on their behalf.”). 
22 Davis v. Blige, 505 F.3d 90, 103 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 117 (2008);
see also Silvers v. Sony Pictures Entm’t, Inc., 402 F.3d 881, 890 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005) (dis-
cussing the value of an accrued right to sue for infringement). 
23 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 6.01 n.1. 
24 See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476 (1976), at 121, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 
5736 (“There is also no need for a specific statutory provision concerning the rights 
and duties of the coowners of a work; court-made law on this point is left undis-
turbed.”).
25 17 U.S.C. § 201(a). 
26 Id. § 101. 
27 See 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 6.01 (explaining that “joint work” is a 
broader concept than “joint authorship”). 
28 STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 89TH CONG., SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT OF 
THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW: 1965
REVISION BILL 66 (Comm. Print 1965); see also 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, 
§ 6.01 (noting that a joint work will result from transfers of individual interests or from 
being passed through a will or intestacy).  Of course, whether a work is coowned is fre-
quently a contested issue.  See, e.g., Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500, 504-09 (2d Cir. 
1991) (discussing whether a contributor to a copyrighted work ought to be considered 
a coowner of the copyright). 
29 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 6.08. 
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coowners for any profits.”30  Thus, each co-owner has a right to use the 
copyrighted work as the Copyright Act provides, including licensing 
such uses to a third party, without the consent of the other joint 
owner or owners. 
The other co-owners, however, are not without protection.  First, 
the unilaterally licensing co-owner has an “obligation to account to 
the other joint owner for any profits that are made.”31  In addition, 
one co-owner cannot sell the interests of her other co-owners without 
their consent32 or use or authorize a use of the work that would lead 
to waste.33
There is some tension between the notion of the exclusivity of a 
copyright holder’s rights and the concept of joint ownership, which 
bestows equal rights to use or license the copyrighted work unilater-
ally.34  The legislative history of the 1976 Copyright Act sheds some 
light on this apparent conflict, identifying two alternative justifications 
for joint copyright ownership.  The first is a practical consideration:  
when each author’s contribution is inseparable and cannot be distin-
guished from the contributions of the other authors, “the only worka-
ble solution is to regard each author as the joint owner of an undi-
vided interest in the entire work.”35  This inseparability is the 
justification for joint ownership when, for example, two authors write 
a single novel together.36  The second occurs when each author’s con-
tributions are independently identifiable, but there is an express or 
30 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476 (1976), at 121, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5736 
(emphasis added). 
31 Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195, 199 (2d Cir. 1998). 
32 See, e.g., Crosney v. Edward Small Prods., Inc., 52 F. Supp. 559, 561 (S.D.N.Y. 
1942) (“One cotenant cannot bind the interest of another, although he purports to do 
so, ‘in the absence of assent or ratification upon her part.’” (quoting In re Hoffman’s 
Estate, 25 N.Y.S.2d 339, 342 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1940))). 
33 See 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 6.10[B] (explaining that this rule de-
rives from the area of tangible property, but that this derivation leaves open the ques-
tion of when intangible property could be said to be destroyed). 
34 See, e.g., Peter Jaszi, On the Author Effect:  Contemporary Copyright and Collective Crea-
tivity, 10 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 293, 315 (“The Copyright Act and case law thus 
tend to treat ‘joint authorship’ as a deviant form of individual ‘authorship.’  Indeed, in 
many particular instances copyright refuses to acknowledge the existence of ‘joint au-
thorship,’ or does so only grudgingly.”).
35 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 6.02; see also H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 120, 
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5736 (“[A] work is ‘joint’ if the authors collaborated 
with each other . . . .”). 
36 See 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 6.02 (“An example of [ joint owner-
ship] is the collaboration of two playwrights whose respective contribution to the final 
play are inextricably combined.”). 
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implied agreement between the authors that the combined contribu-
tions are to form an “indivisible whole,” as in the case of a motion pic-
ture or an opera.37
C. The Alienability of Copyrights 
A copyright holder can distribute or assign to other parties the 
rights associated with her copyright.38  A copyright holder can, for ex-
ample, grant another party a license to use the work as the owner 
might—that is, in any or all of the manners specified in section 106 of 
the Copyright Act.  The licensee is entitled to use the work with im-
munity, without being held liable for infringing the copyright because 
of that use.39  This immunity, however, is limited to the use specified 
by the license; if the licensee uses the work in a manner inconsistent 
with the license, she can be held liable for copyright infringement.40
A license therefore immunizes a user of a copyrighted work from 
the threat of being liable for infringement.  In the joint-ownership 
context, where each co-owner can act unilaterally and independently 
of her other co-owners,41 a license from only one of the co-owners is 
enough to provide the licensee with immunity from an infringement 
action brought by another co-owner.42   
37 See id.; see also H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 120, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 
5736 (“[A] work is ‘joint’ if . . . each of the authors prepared his or her contribution 
with the knowledge and intention that it would be merged with the contributions of 
other authors as ‘inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole.’”). 
38 See 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(2) (2006); 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 6.11. 
39 See Graham v. James, 144 F.3d 229, 236 (2d Cir. 1998) (“A copyright owner who 
grants a nonexclusive license to use his copyrighted material waives his right to sue the 
licensee for copyright infringement.”); Jacob Maxwell, Inc. v. Veeck, 110 F.3d 749, 753 
(11th Cir. 1997) (holding that implicit in the permission to play a song is the promise 
not to sue for infringement); 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 13.04 (noting the 
availability of a defense based on a license). 
40 See 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 10.02. 
41 See supra notes 29-33 and accompanying text. 
42 See Batiste v. Island Records, Inc., 179 F.3d 217, 224 (5th Cir. 1999) (“[A]n au-
thorization to the defendant from one joint owner will be an effective defense to an 
infringement action brought by another joint owner.” (quoting 1 NIMMER & NIMMER,
supra note 4, § 6.10[A])); McKay v. CBS Inc., 324 F.2d 762, 763 (2d Cir. 1963) (“[A] 
license from a co-holder of a copyright immunizes the licensee from liability to the 
other co-holder for copyright infringement.”); 5 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPY-
RIGHT § 21:38.50 (2008) (“[A] license from one joint owner precludes suit against the 
licensee.”). 
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D.  Retroactive Conveyances 
At issue in this Comment is a problem arising from that undis-
puted fact that a license from only one of the co-owners is enough to 
immunize the licensee from an infringement action brought by an-
other co-owner.  The problem at issue here results from the use of af-
ter-the-fact conveyances. 
There is a certain practice, common in some industries, known as 
a “retroactive transfer” or “retroactive license.”43 According to this 
practice, a copyright owner conveys the right to use a copyrighted 
work as in any ordinary transfer or license, but does so retrospectively.  
That is, one party (who does not own any copyright) has already used 
the copyrighted work without an owner’s express or implied authori-
zation to do so.  The copyright owner, however, in the course of pur-
suing her rightful remedies, elects not to pursue such an action to 
judgment, but rather grants the third-party infringer a license that 
purportedly authorizes those past infringements—a retroactive li-
cense.44  This retroactive license may or may not authorize future uses, 
but it claims to give permission to the infringer to use the work in the 
past time period in which she did use it.  Thus considered, a retroac-
tive license is indeed a legal fiction, and one over which courts and 
commentators disagree. 
The problem explored in this Comment occurs when the copy-
right to the work is jointly held and a retroactive license is granted by 
43 See 2 PATRY, supra note 42, § 5:111–:112 (describing “after-the-fact transfer” as a 
response to unintentionally invalid oral agreements for copyright ownership).  While 
Patry describes retroactive transfers largely as later written ratifications of prior oral 
agreements (as oral agreements are invalid transfers under the Copyright Act, see 17 
U.S.C. § 204(a)), my discussion of retroactive transfers is not confined to that context.  
I include those transfers that do not even claim to be later ratifications of prior oral 
agreements. See generally infra Part II (discussing numerous examples of retroactive 
transfers).
44 This right can take the form of a license, or it can be included as part of a re-
lease or settlement agreement.  While there are significant differences between the two 
types of transactions, courts tend to treat the retroactive nature of each type of transac-
tion in the same way, since, in an important sense, many settlements operate as retro-
active licenses.  See Country Rd. Music, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 2d 325, 329 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“[T]he unambiguous language of this [settlement agreement] creates 
a retroactive reproduction license that cures any past infringement . . . .”); 2 PATRY,
supra note 42, § 5:112 (“[T]he ability of a copyright owner (or one coowner) to retro-
actively excuse, through a . . . settlement agreement, infringing activity should be un-
questioned, and it is by most courts.”); Self, supra note 10, at 73-74 (suggesting that set-
tlements be regarded as retroactive licenses).  But see Davis v. Blige, 505 F.3d 90, 102 
(2d Cir. 2007) (“Licenses and assignments function differently from settlements and 
releases . . . .”), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 117 (2008).
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fewer than all of the copyright holders.  As discussed above, a license 
granted by even one co-owner immunizes the licensee from infringe-
ment claims by other co-owners.  Yet when this license is retroactive, 
more than simple immunization takes place.  While the license pur-
ports to authorize such a past use, that use was, in fact, not authorized 
at the time the third party used the copyrighted work.  Thus, the use 
may well be an act of infringement.45  If it was an act of infringement, 
the thinking goes, each copyright owner should have an individual 
right to pursue an action for the act of infringement that the Copy-
right Act provides,46 seeking, for example, her own proportional dam-
ages arising from that infringement.47  This right to pursue an action 
is a right incident to copyright ownership.48  The infringer’s retroac-
tive license granted by the other co-owner, however, abrogates this 
right.  This grant, according to some courts and commentators, vio-
lates the principle that one co-owner cannot divest her co-owners of 
their rights.49
As a result, some courts have limited a co-owner’s right to grant a 
retroactive license to an infringer and have held that a settlement with 
or release from one co-owner does not extinguish other co-owners’ 
copyright infringement claims, while others have not imposed such 
limitations on individual copyright owners.  The way that courts have 
handled this issue and the bases for their rulings are the subject of the 
following discussion. 
II. JUDICIAL APPROACHES TO RETROACTIVE TRANSFERS
Since this issue has not arisen with great frequency in the case law, 
and since the few cases on point have used different approaches and 
reached conflicting conclusions, an overview of these rulings is in or-
der.  The cases also help demonstrate the practical effects of retroac-
tive conveyances on the parties involved. 
45 See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (indicating that the use of the copyrighted work is exclusive 
to copyright holders and licensees). 
46 See id. § 501(a)–(b). 
47 See id. § 504 (providing remedies for infringement). 
48 See id. § 501(a)–(b) (defining infringement and providing that “[t]he legal . . . 
owner of . . . [a] right under a copyright is entitled . . . to institute an action for any 
infringement of that particular right committed while he or she is the owner of it”); 
ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 944 F.2d 971, 980 (2d Cir. 1991) (noting 
the exclusive right of a copyright owner to bring actions for infringement of that 
right).
49 See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
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A.  Decisions Finding That Unilateral Retroactive  
Transfers Provide Immunization 
Unilateral retroactive transfers from one co-owner have immu-
nized an infringer from the claims of other co-owners in at least seven 
cases.  The first of these cases was SBK Catalogue Partnership v. Orion 
Pictures Corp.,50 which provided the basis for an influential decision out 
of the Southern District of New York, Lone Wolf McQuade Associates v. 
CBS Inc.51  The Lone Wolf decision, perhaps because of the importance 
of the Southern District of New York in copyright law, became the ba-
sis for subsequent decisions.  These two decisions and the few cases 
that rely on them are discussed below with others that have enforced 
the curative power of unilateral retroactive licenses. 
1. SBK Catalogue Partnership v. Orion Pictures Corp.
SBK, a 1989 decision by the District of New Jersey, was one of the 
first to hold that a unilateral retroactive transfer by one owner of a 
jointly held copyright would immunize a third-party user from in-
fringement actions brought by the other joint owners.52  In SBK, the 
copyrighted work at issue was a musical composition entitled “Pepino, 
The Italian Mouse,” which was composed by Wandra Merrell and Ray 
Allen in 1962.53  Merrell and Allen assigned all rights to “Pepino” to 
Romance Music, Inc., who then assigned half of its ownership interest 
to Ding Dong Music Corp.; Romance’s fifty-percent stake followed a 
chain of assignments until, in 1983, SBK Catalogue Partnership ac-
quired that interest.54  In 1984, Orion Pictures released the Woody Al-
len film Broadway Danny Rose containing the musical composition 
“Agita,” which Merrell and Allen claimed infringed upon “Pepino.”55
Merrell and Allen, claiming ownership rights in “Pepino,” filed suit 
against Orion alleging copyright infringement;56 SBK Catalogue inter-
vened, also claiming copyright infringement as a fifty-percent holder 
of the copyright to the work.57
50 723 F. Supp. 1053 (D.N.J. 1989). 
51 961 F. Supp. 587 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). 
52 SBK, 723 F. Supp. at 1059, 1072. 
53 Id. at 1056-57. 
54 Id. at 1057. 
55 Id.
56 Id. at 1058. 
57 Id. at 1058-59. 
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After protracted settlement negotiations, SBK Catalogue and 
Orion reached a settlement agreement.58  “The agreement,” the court 
noted, “contemplated a retroactive written license for the use of the 
musical composition ‘Pepino,’” and prompted Orion, based upon on 
its newly acquired license, to move for summary judgment against 
Merrell and Allen, which the court granted.59  While this specific 
summary judgment order was the subject of an unpublished decision, 
the court confirmed the preclusive effect of its previous finding that 
SBK Catalogue “was entirely within its rights to grant a retroactive li-
cense to the Orion defendants.”60  Without extensive discussion, the 
court noted that SBK Catalogue’s license to Orion, despite being 
granted retroactively, was sufficient, and held that that “authorization 
. . . is an effective defense to an infringement action brought by an-
other joint owner.”61
2. Lone Wolf McQuade Associates v. CBS Inc.
The Southern District of New York, relying on SBK, held in Lone 
Wolf McQuade Associates v. CBS Inc. that a unilateral “retroactive license 
can cure past infringements.”62  The plaintiff brought an action 
against CBS alleging that CBS’s popular television series, “Walker 
Texas Ranger,” violated the plaintiff’s copyrights in their movie, Lone 
Wolf McQuade, both of which starred the actor Chuck Norris.63
Well before the litigation began, Orion Pictures Corp. purchased 
most of the rights to and interests in Lone Wolf McQuade, and, in 1982, 
conveyed “all right, title and interest in and to all copyrights in the 
Film” to Lone Wolf McQuade Associates, “but expressly did not con-
vey and reserved various rights including ‘any interest whatsoever in 
and to . . . any television series rights . . . .’”64  Orion and CBS later dis-
cussed various television spinoffs of the Lone Wolf McQuade film, but 
could not reach an agreement before CBS aired “Walker, Texas 
Ranger.”65  After Lone Wolf McQuade Associates filed suit against 
58 Id. at 1059. 
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 961 F. Supp. 587, 597 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). 
63 Id. at 590-91. 
64 Id. at 591 (quoting purchase agreement between Orion and Lone Wolf 
McQuade Associates). 
65 Id.
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CBS, Orion intervened in the action, alleging that CBS infringed its
rights to the copyright in Lone Wolf McQuade.66
Orion eventually settled its copyright infringement claim with CBS 
in a 1996 settlement agreement, which included a retroactive license 
for CBS to use Lone Wolf McQuade in connection with its “Walker 
Texas Ranger” series.67  CBS then sought to use this retroactive license 
as a defense to Lone Wolf McQuade Associates’ copyright infringe-
ment claim.68  The court, citing SBK, held that “a retroactive license 
can cure past infringements,” despite the plaintiff’s argument “that 
Orion’s retroactive license in favor of CBS does not cure any in-
fringement that occurred prior to the date of the grant of the li-
cense.”69  The Lone Wolf court, like the SBK court, did not engage in 
an extended analysis. 
3. Johnson v. Tuff-N-Rumble Management, Inc.
Relying exclusively on the Lone Wolf decision, the Eastern District 
of Louisiana in Johnson v. Tuff-N-Rumble Management, Inc. held that a 
retroactive license granted unilaterally by a single co-owner cured 
prior infringement.70  The retroactive license in this case, granted to 
certain defendants as part of a settlement agreement (as in Lone Wolf
and SBK), “effectively ended all plaintiffs’ claims against the . . . de-
fendants because these defendants as licensees could not infringe 
upon the song’s copyright.”71
4. Silberstein v. Fox Entertainment Group
A later case in the Southern District of New York also relied exclu-
sively upon the Lone Wolf decision.  In Silberstein v. Fox Entertainment 
Group, Inc., the plaintiff had used an animated character in various 
publicity campaigns; she soon discovered that the Twentieth Century 
Fox Film Corporation (Fox) was using a similar animated character in 
a forthcoming motion picture, Ice Age, and initiated suit against Fox to 
enjoin it from using the allegedly infringing character.72  During the 
66 Id. at 590-91. 
67 Id. at 590. 
68 Id.
69 Id. at 597-98. 
70 No. 99-1374, 2000 WL 1808486, at *1 (E.D. La. Dec. 8, 2000), appeal dismissed,
253 F.3d 701 (5th Cir. 2001). 
71 Id.
72 424 F. Supp. 2d 616, 620-21 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
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course of litigation, it was discovered that the plaintiff’s character it-
self was a copy of a copyrighted character jointly owned by a clip-art 
company and its artist.73  The plaintiff then purchased from the clip-
art artist the rights to the character, retroactive to its creation.74  Fox, 
seeking to escape any chance of liability to the plaintiff, negotiated for 
and purchased a nonexclusive license to the character from the clip-
art company, also retroactive to the date of the character’s creation.75
The court, noting that a license from one co-owner is a defense to in-
fringement actions by another co-owner, dismissed the plaintiff’s 
claims.76  The court held that “[t]he retroactivity of the licensing 
agreement between [copyright co-owner] DAS and Fox has no neces-
sary effect on its power to immunize Fox against claims of infringe-
ment of the [original] copyright.”77  The court gave no further expla-
nation for its decision granting immunizing power to the retroactive 
license. 
5. Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films LLC
The court that decided Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films 
LLC78 did not rely on either SBK or Lone Wolf.  In this case, the plain-
tiff alleged that the defendant infringed the plaintiff’s copyright in the 
musical composition “100 Miles and Running” in the defendant’s 
1998 film, I Got the Hook Up.79  The defendant asserted two alternative 
defenses:  first, that it received an oral license from the original co-
owners of “100 Miles” in 1998—prior to the plaintiff’s acquisition of 
any ownership interest—and second, that it received a written license 
from the original co-owners in 2002 retroactive to the date of in-
fringement, and, either way, it ought to be immune from suit.80  The 
plaintiff argued that Leicester v. Warner Bros.81—discussed below—
which the plaintiff read to bar retroactive licenses, should control.82
73 Id. at 622. 
74 Id. at 622-23. 
75 Id. at 623. 
76 Id. at 629. 
77 Id.
78 230 F. Supp. 2d 830 (M.D. Tenn. 2002), rev’d on other grounds, 383 F.3d 390 (6th 
Cir. 2004), modified, 401 F.3d 647 (6th Cir. 2004). 
79 Id. at 833. 
80 Id. at 835-36. 
81 No. 95-4058, 1998 WL 34016724 (C.D. Cal. May 29, 1998), aff’d on other grounds,
232 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 2000). 
82 Bridgeport Music, 230 F. Supp. 2d at 836-37. 
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The court found the defendant’s first defense persuasive and held 
that the defendant did receive an oral license from at least one of the 
song’s co-owners.83  In analyzing the alternative defense, the court 
viewed the 2002 retroactive license as a memorialization of the earlier 
oral license, distinguishing it from Leicester and from standard retroac-
tive licenses.84
6.  MP3.com Litigation 
Extensive litigation relating to the MP3.com website prompted the 
Southern District of New York to rule again on a retroactive license.  
The defendant, MP3.com, “purchased tens of thousands of popular 
CDs in which plaintiffs held the copyrights, and, without authoriza-
tion, copied their recordings onto its computer servers so as to be able 
to replay the recordings for its subscribers”—a “clear” act of infringe-
ment in the opinion of the district court.85  MP3.com settled with 
some of the copyright holders, including the Harry Fox Agency 
(HFA), “a licensing and collection agency for music publishers,” 
which allegedly co-owned some of the works at issue.86  The court held 
that “the unambiguous language of this release creates a retroactive 
reproduction license that cures any past infringement by MP3.com of 
these works.”87 Unlike previous cases, the court explicitly noted that it 
was construing the release agreement as a retroactive license,88 citing a 
Sixth Circuit case for the proposition that “a release can, in certain 
circumstances, have the effect of and be construed as a license,”89 de-
spite “the absence of the word ‘license’” from the settlement’s lan-
83 See id. at 835 (“[T]he Court finds that the defendant obtained a valid oral li-
cense from at least one of the original owners for use of ‘100 Miles’ prior to Bridgeport 
obtaining any ownership interest in the song.”).
84 Id. at 835-36. 
85 UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 350 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
86 Copyright.Net Music Publ’g LLC v. MP3.com, Inc., No. 01-7321, 2003 WL 
740757, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 4, 2003).
87 Country Rd. Music, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 2d 325, 329 (S.D.N.Y. 
2003).  The release provided in pertinent part:  “HFA, for and on behalf of the Settling 
HFA-Releasors, further agrees that any Copyrighted Works owned or controlled by the 
HFA-Releasors which were previously copied by MP3.com in connection with its 
My.MP3.com service shall be deemed to have been copied with each of the HFA-
Releasor’s respective consent.”  Id.
88 Copyright.Net, 2003 WL 740757, at *1.
89 Shatterproof Glass Corp. v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 482 F.2d 317, 320 (6th Cir. 
1973).
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guage.90  Thus, the court found that the retroactive licenses granted as 
part of the settlement agreement provided defenses against HFA’s co-
owners’ infringement claims.91
7. Venegas-Hernandez v. Peer
The District of Puerto Rico, in Venegas-Hernandez v. Peer,92 recently 
relied on Lone Wolf and SBK to uphold a unilateral retroactive trans-
fer.  More importantly, however, this case presents an interesting sce-
nario that makes the fictional quality of a retroactive transfer appar-
ent.  In Venegas-Hernandez, the plaintiffs, heirs of a Puerto Rican 
composer, inherited joint ownership in their father’s musical works 
and alleged that numerous defendants had infringed their copy-
rights.93  While this case is peppered with grants of retroactive licenses, 
one defendant (who allegedly infringed the copyright in 1993) 
claimed that a codefendant and former joint owner of the copyrights 
to a work at issue, the Latin American Music Company (LAMCO), had 
granted it a license to use the work in 1998, retroactive to 1993.94
Plaintiffs argued that LAMCO did not actually own the rights to the 
work in 1993, when the other defendant allegedly infringed their 
copyright.95  The district court noted that because retroactive licenses 
protect an infringer from suits based on past infringement,96 “[t]he 
granting of a retroactive license implies that the retroactive licensor 
had the requisite ownership and, therefore, authority to make such a 
grant at the time the infringement occurred.”97  The court found that 
since LAMCO did not own the rights to the work at the past time to 
which the retroactive transfer extended, LAMCO, through its retroac-
tive transfer, was liable as a contributory infringer (for causing its ret-
90 Country Rd. Music, 279 F. Supp. 2d at 329. 
91 Id. at 329-30; Copyright.Net, 2003 WL 740757, at *1-2.
92 No. 01-1215, 2004 WL 3686337, at *33 (D.P.R. May 19, 2004), aff’d in part, rev’d 
on other grounds sub nom. Venegas-Hernández v. Asociación de Compositores y Editores 
de Música Latinoamericana  (ACEMLA), 424 F.3d 50 (1st Cir. 2005). 
93 Venegas-Hernandez, 2004 WL 3686337, at *1-2. 
94 Id. at *33. 
95 Id.
96 Id. (citing Lone Wolf McQuade Assoc. v. CBS Inc., 961 F. Supp. 587, 596 
(S.D.N.Y. 1957); SBK Catalogue P’ship v. Orion Pictures Corp., 723 F. Supp. 1053, 
1059 (D.N.J. 1989)). 
97 Id.
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roactive licensee to infringe).98  The court then awarded the plaintiffs 
LAMCO’s profits from the retroactive transfer.99
On appeal, the First Circuit noted that “obviously a license 
[granted] in 1998 did not ‘cause’ a 1993 infringement.”100  Yet the 
court did not have a chance either to opine on the use of retroactive 
transfers or to overrule the district court’s ruling, since LAMCO did 
“not pursue this interesting point, relying instead on a statute of limi-
tations argument.”101  The court also noted that “the discussion in the 
briefs is too sparse to justify any serious attempt to develop principles 
in this recherché area of copyright law.”102
B. Decisions Finding That Unilateral Retroactive  
Transfers Do Not Provide Immunization 
There is another line of cases, which, unlike SBK, Lone Wolf, and 
their progeny, does not allow unilateral retroactive transfers to cure 
past infringement.103  Also unlike SBK and Lone Wolf, the courts in 
these cases did not reach their conclusions by relying on any specific 
precedent but instead tended to make somewhat vague (with the ex-
ception of Davis v. Blige) policy arguments. 
1. David v. Showtime/The Movie Channel, Inc.
The plaintiffs in David v. Showtime/The Movie Channel, Inc., were 
members of the American Society of Composers, Authors and Pub-
lishers (ASCAP) who alleged that the defendant infringed their copy-
rights in musical works by broadcasting them without authorization.104
The defendant was licensed by ASCAP to broadcast the works in ques-
tion until 1980; following the expiration of that license, the defendant 
98 Id.
99 Id. at *34. 
100 Venegas-Hernández v. Asociación de Compositores y Editores de Música Lati-
noamericana (ACEMLA), 424 F.3d 50, 60 (1st Cir. 2005). 
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 Some, however, have interpreted the cases discussed in this section (with the 
exception of Davis v. Blige) as not necessarily ruling on the curative power of unilateral 
retroactive licenses.  See 2 PATRY, supra note 42, § 5:112 n.3 (distinguishing Leicester v. 
Warner Bros., No. 95-4058, 1998 WL 34016724, at *1 (C.D. Cal. May 29, 1998), aff’d on 
other grounds, 232 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 2000), and David v. Showtime/The Movie 
Chanel, Inc., 697 F. Supp. 752, 753-55 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), from cases concerning retroac-
tive licenses because they involved nonexclusive licenses). 
104 697 F. Supp. 752, 753-55 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). 
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could forgo negotiating a new license and instead apply to ASCAP for 
a license pursuant to a consent decree between ASCAP and the De-
partment of Justice.  When the defendant’s license expired, it chose to 
negotiate to renew the licensing agreements, instead of applying un-
der the consent decree.105  The defendant continued to broadcast the 
songs, without a finalized license, while undergoing negotiations.  
When negotiations failed, the defendant applied to ASCAP for a li-
cense retroactive to the date of the old license’s expiration.106  Plain-
tiffs sued for infringement.107
The Southern District of New York held that the defendant’s ap-
plication for a retroactive license did not bar the plaintiffs’ infringe-
ment claims.  The court explained that “recognition of the subse-
quent filing of an application for a ‘retroactive’ license as a defense 
for prior infringing conduct would eviscerate the protections inherent 
in the copyright scheme.”108  The court did not elaborate on which 
protections would be eviscerated or how this might occur. 
2. Leicester v. Warner Bros.
In Leicester v. Warner Bros., plaintiff, an artist, was employed by a 
real estate developer to create sculptural elements for the developer’s 
Los Angeles building.109  The rights to the sculptural design were co-
owned by the plaintiff and, as the district court concluded, the archi-
tect.110  In 1994, the developer, without contacting the architect or the 
plaintiff, allowed Warner Brothers to make replicas and use depictions 
of the developer’s property in connection with the film Batman For-
ever.111  In 1995, the plaintiff sued Warner Brothers for copyright in-
fringement.  The Central District of California ruled that since the de-
veloper was granted a nonexclusive license to reproduce the work, it 
could not sublicense that right to Warner Brothers.112
105 Id. at 754 & n.1. 
106 Id. at 754-55. 
107 Id. at 755. 
108 Id. at 764. 
109 No. 95-4058, 1998 WL 34016724, at *1 (C.D. Cal. May 29, 1998), aff’d on other 
grounds, 232 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 2000). 
110 Id. at *4. 
111 Id. at *2. 
112 Id. at *3 (“[T]he grant of the license may not be assigned or sublicensed by the 
licensee unless the grant of the license is exclusive.” (citing 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra
note 4, § 10.01[C][4])). 
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As a defense, Warner Brothers argued that it had received a li-
cense to use and sublicense the work.  During the course of this litiga-
tion, and after the plaintiff had brought suit, the architect granted a 
retroactive license to the developer, which had an explicit provision 
permitting sublicensing.  The court invalidated this retroactive subli-
censing provision and rejected Warner Brothers’ argument, finding 
that since the architect was a co-owner of the copyright, he could only 
grant a nonexclusive license, which could not have a sublicensing pro-
vision.113  The court briefly noted another reason (more relevant for 
our purposes) for rejecting the retroactive license defense: 
At the time Warner Bros. took the pictures and made pictorial reproduc-
tions of [the work], it had no license to do so.  It’s [sic] actions at that 
time, if an infringement of Mr. Leicester’s copyright, could not be later 
validated by the grant of the license. . . . The court rejects the idea that 
the earlier infringement can be retroactively validated by the later grant 
of the license.
114
3. Encore Entertainment, LLC v. KIDdesigns, Inc.
In this “labyrinthine” copyright infringement case, the defendant 
argued that its alleged infringements were “cured” because it received 
a retroactive license that covered its allegedly infringing activities.115
Acknowledging that no federal circuit court had addressed the issue 
of whether retroactive licenses could cure prior infringements, the 
court noted the differing conclusions of the Leicester and Showtime
courts on the one hand and the Lone Wolf and SBK courts on the 
other.116  The court concluded that Leicester and Showtime were more 
persuasive.117  In support of its conclusion, the court 
note[d] that, to find otherwise, would promote a scenario whereby indi-
viduals would be permitted, if not encouraged, to willingly infringe upon 
a copyright interest until caught and then, once caught, simply apply for 
a retroactive license to avoid liability for earlier infringement.  Such a 
113 Id. at *5. 
114 Id. at *6. 
115 Encore Entm’t, LLC v. KIDdesigns, Inc., No. 3:03-1129, 2005 WL 2249897, at 
*1, *3 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 14, 2005).
116 Id. at *10. 
117 Id.  Some find the court’s reliance on the first two cases to be misplaced.  See,
e.g., 2 PATRY, supra note 42, § 5:112 n.3 (“Neither case supports Encore Entmt’s posi-
tion.”).
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scheme would plainly contradict the purposes underlying federal copy-
right law.
118
The court did not elaborate on its holding beyond this statement. 
4. Davis v. Blige
In 2007, the Second Circuit attempted to answer the question at 
issue in this Comment, calling into doubt the precedential value of 
Lone Wolf, Silberstein, and the MP3.com litigation.  The decision, Davis 
v. Blige, is the first appellate judgment to pick up where the Venegas-
Hernandez court left off and rule on whether a retroactive license from 
one co-owner immunizes an infringer from suits by other co-owners.119
In Davis, the circuit court reversed the district court and held that a 
license could only act prospectively and could not cure past infringe-
ment.120
In Davis, plaintiff Sharice Davis sued Mary J. Blige and others in 
December 2003, claiming that two songs on Blige’s 2001 album in-
fringed Davis’s copyrights in two other songs.121  Davis claimed that 
the songs were written by her and Bruce Chambliss, but Davis was not 
given songwriting credit on the album, which listed the authors as 
Blige (Chambliss’s stepdaughter), Bruce Miller (Chambliss’s son), 
and others.122  Chambliss, who was not a party to the suit, claimed that 
he had granted Miller rights in the songs in an oral transfer around 
the time of the songs’ composition.123  On the day before Chambliss 
(who was not a party in the action) was to be first deposed, Chambliss 
and Miller signed a written transfer agreement, which purported to 
transfer to Miller all interests in the songs and all rights “past, present, 
and future . . . effective as of the date [Chambliss] first create[d] the 
above-referenced Composition.”124  The defendants claimed that these 
written agreements merely ratified their earlier oral transfers, or, in 
the alternative, that the written agreements themselves retroactively 
118 Encore Entm’t, 2005 WL 2249897, at *10. 
119 Davis v. Blige, 505 F.3d 90, 97 (2d Cir. 2007) (“[T]here is no appellate case law 
on the issue of retroactive assignment of copyright . . . .”), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 117 
(2008).
120 Id. at 102-04. 
121 Id. at 94. 
122 Id.
123 Id. at 95. 
124 Id. at 96 (alterations in original) (emphasis omitted) (quoting the transfer 
agreement).
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granted Miller ownership of the works.125  Since Miller was an owner 
of the work, the defendants claimed, neither he nor anyone to whom 
he licensed the works (i.e., Blige and the other defendants) could in-
fringe the works.126
The district court ruled that regardless of the existence of any 
prior oral transfer, 
[w]here there is no dispute between transferor and transferee of a copy-
right as to the validity of the transfer, such a transfer has been consis-
tently upheld.  This is the case even where the license or transfer takes 
place after the institution of an action for copyright infringement, and 
indeed, even where the plaintiff in the action is the other co-owner of 
the copyright and the retroactive license or transfer by one co-owner 
serves to bar the infringement claim of the other co-owner.
127
The district court found the circumstances in David v. Showtime/The 
Movie Channel to be distinguishable and understood the Leicester
court’s finding arguably barring retroactive transfers to be both a 
mere ancillary ground for its final holding and “contrary to the great 
weight of authority.”128  The district court concluded that the retroac-
tive transfer barred the infringement claims.129
The Second Circuit reversed the district court, finding that allow-
ing one co-owner to cure the past infringements of a third party ex-
tinguished the nonparty co-owner’s valuable right to sue for infringe-
ment—a right that accrues at the time of the infringement.130  A co-
owner, the court held, could herself grant a retroactive license and 
thus bar her own infringement claims, but could not eradicate the 
claims of her co-owners.131  Thus, a retroactive license from one co-
owner would not immunize an infringer from suits by other co-owners. 
125 Id. at 95-97. 
126 Id. at 96-97. 
127 Davis v. Blige, 419 F. Supp. 2d 493, 499 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), rev’d on other grounds,
505 F.3d 90 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 117 (2008).  The district court cited 
favorably Lone Wolf, Silberstein, the MP3.com litigation, and Tuff-N-Rumble Mgmt.
128 Id. at 500, 501 n.4 (asserting that Showtime was distinguishable because it in-
volved defendants who were seeking to obtain a retroactive license and that the argu-
ment in Leicester against retroactive application was unconvincing). 
129 Id. at 499-501 (holding that “there exists no genuine issue as to the intent of co-
author Chambliss to transfer his rights to Miller” and in such a case lower courts agree 
that the transfer bars an infringement claim). 
130 Davis, 505 F.3d at 103-04. 
131 See id. at 104 (“We have no doubt that Chambliss can release his own accrued 
claims of copyright infringement against Miller and his fellow defendants, either orally 
or in writing.  But we know of no authority to sanction his attempt to release any rights 
Davis has against Miller, for they are not Chambliss’s to release.”).
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In reversing, the Second Circuit also distinguished the case at 
hand from the Lone Wolf line of cases that related to settlements, not 
licenses alone, as in Davis.132  The court held that licenses could only 
be prospective, and that only releases could cure prior infringement.133
Yet despite this distinction, the court not only ruled on retroactive li-
censes, but also took occasion to announce that “[a] settlement 
agreement can only waive or extinguish claims held by a settling 
owner; it can have no effect on co-owners who are not parties to the 
settlement agreement.”134  Thus, a release of infringement claims 
would need to come from each individual co-owner. 
The Second Circuit found support for its conclusions in the prin-
ciples of copyright, contract, tort, property, and patent law.135  While 
the principles the court found relevant and the propriety of their ap-
plication have been questioned, as discussed below, the court did be-
lieve that its decision would discourage infringement and increase 
certainty and predictability, such that it would be clear whether a par-
ticular exploitation of a work was authorized.136
The Davis decision has been criticized in the entertainment indus-
try, where retroactive transfers are common.  The Recording Industry 
Association of America137 and the Motion Picture Association of Amer-
ica138 have both filed petitions for rehearing as amici curiae, and 
Google’s senior copyright counsel, copyright scholar William Patry, 
has called the decision “a disaster of major proportions” that “reflects 
a stunning deafness to the commercial realities of life.”139
132 Id. at 102. 
133 Id. at 104. 
134 Id. at 102. 
135 See, e.g., id. at 97-98 (“Although the Copyright Act itself is silent on the issue of 
retroactive transfer or license, we conclude that such retroactive transfers violate basic 
principles of tort and contract law, and undermine the policies embodied by the Copy-
right Act.”).
136 Id. at 104-06. 
137 The Recording Industry Association of America is a trade group representing 
the U.S. recording industry, including record labels and distributors who create, 
manufacture, and/or distribute approximately ninety percent of the sound recordings 
produced and sold in the United States.  Recording Industry Association of America, 
Who We Are, http://www.riaa.com/aboutus.php (last visited Jan. 15, 2009). 
138 The Motion Picture Association of America is a trade group representing the 
motion-picture, home-video, and television industries, including producers and dis-
tributors.  Motion Picture Association of America, About Us, http://www.mpaa.org/ 
AboutUs.asp (last visited Jan. 15, 2009). 
139 Posting of William Patry to The Patry Copyright Blog, The Second Circuit Goes 
to the Dark Side, http://williampatry.blogspot.com/2007/10/second-circuit-goes-to-
2009] Unilateral Settlements and Retroactive Transfers 903
III. GUIDING PRINCIPLES
As described above, courts have undertaken various analyses and 
reached different conclusions regarding retroactive transfers.  Thus, 
an analysis of the potentially relevant legal principles can help identify 
possible solutions to the problems of retroactive transfers. 
A.  The Goals of the Copyright Act and Copyright Law Considerations 
Most of the courts that have limited the ability of retroactive trans-
fers to cure infringement did so at least in part because they believed 
that retroactive transfers threatened the purposes of the Copyright 
Act.140  But these courts have also overwhelmingly failed to indicate 
which particular purposes of the Act need protection.  Since any reso-
lution of this problem should align with these purposes, it is fitting to 
attempt to articulate them here. 
Copyright regulation falls within the federal government’s ambit 
by virtue of the Copyright Clause of the Constitution,141 and Congress 
has enacted copyright protection schemes since the Founding.  An 
explicit goal enumerated in the first copyright act, in line with the 
Copyright Clause, was to encourage learning.142  While no explicit di-
rection is given on how to encourage learning,143 clear views on how to 
do so were expressed in the legislative history.  A committee estab-
lished by the Continental Congress, empowered to investigate how 
dark-side.html (Oct. 8, 2007, 9:00 EST) (arguing that the Second Circuit failed “to un-
derstand the statute”). 
140 See, e.g., Davis, 505 F.3d at 105 (stating that to uphold a defense of retroactive 
transfer would be “contrary to the intent of Congress in enacting the Copyright Act of 
1976”); Encore Entm’t, LLC v. KIDdesigns, Inc., No. 03-1129, 2005 WL 2249897, at *10 
(M.D. Tenn. Sept. 14, 2005) (“Such a scheme would plainly contradict the purposes 
underlying federal copyright law.”); David v. Showtime/The Movie Channel, Inc., 697 
F. Supp. 752, 764 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (noting that retroactive license defenses “would evis-
cerate the protections inherent in the copyright scheme”). 
141 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“To promote the Progress of Science and useful 
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to 
their respective Writings and Discoveries.”). 
142 See Act of May 31, 1790, 1st Cong., 2d Sess., ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (1790) (repealed 
1802) (characterizing the act in the preamble as “[a]n Act for the encouragement of 
learning, by securing the copies of maps, charts, and books, to the authors and pro-
prietors of such copies, during the times therein mentioned”).  This language is iden-
tical to Great Britain’s first copyright act, known as the Statute of Anne.  See Copyright 
Act 1709, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19. 
143 William Patry, The Failure of the American Copyright System:  Protecting the Idle Rich,
72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 907, 910-11 (1997). 
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best to promote “genius” and the “useful arts,”144 concluded that 
“nothing is more properly a man’s own than the fruit of his study, and 
that the protection and security of literary property would greatly tend 
to encourage genius.”  Accordingly, the committee recommended to 
the states that they provide authors and publishers “exclusive right[s]” 
to their work.145  The goals of copyright were thus (1) to grant the 
creator of a work the rights to the product of his efforts, and (2) to 
encourage, by such a grant, the development of new works that would 
promote the public good. 
These goals have remained conceptually constant through the 
present, though the former has taken on a decidedly secondary—
albeit enabling—role.146  In fact, the Supreme Court has stated that 
the purpose of copyright protection is “to motivate the creative activity 
of authors and inventors by the provision of a special reward, and to 
allow the public access to the products of their genius after the limited 
period of exclusive control has expired.”147  In so remarking, the court 
noted that “[t]he monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize 
are neither unlimited nor primarily designed to provide a special pri-
vate benefit.”148  Accordingly, any scheme regarding retroactive trans-
fers ought not to provide simply a reward to a co-owner of a copyright 
without encouraging the “ultimate aim” of benefitting the public.
To be sure, the profit-making power of a co-owner or creator of a 
copyrighted work cannot be underestimated when considering what 
would be best for the public good.149  In furtherance of these goals, 
144 24 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 180 (1783).  This committee, as 
it were, included James Madison.  Id. at 326. 
145 Id. at 326-27.  This is the essential Lockean justification for copyright.  See, e.g.,
Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 305 (1988) (“The 
‘labor-desert’ theory asserts that labor often creates social value, and it is this produc-
tion of social value that ‘deserves’ reward, not the labor that produced it.”). 
146 The Supreme Court has noted: 
Creative work is to be encouraged and rewarded, but private motivation must 
ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad public availability of literature, 
music, and the other arts.  The immediate effect of our copyright law is to se-
cure a fair return for an ‘author’s’ creative labor.  But the ultimate aim is, by 
this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good. 
Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (footnote omitted), 
superseded by statute, Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified 
in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.). 
147 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984). 
148 Id.
149 See Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 802 F. Supp. 1, 27 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) 
(“[C]opyright law celebrates the profit motive, recognizing that the incentive to profit 
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Congress, through the Copyright Act, has given copyright holders a 
monopoly over the rights to their works.  This monopoly takes the 
form of the rights granted to a copyright holder listed in sections 106 
to 122 of the Act.150  These rights are exclusive to the copyright 
holder.151  In order to keep these rights exclusive and deter others 
from violating this monopoly (and therefore making the creation less 
valuable to the copyright holder), the Act provides that copyright 
holders can be awarded damages for infringement as well as any ac-
tual profits received by an infringer, or alternatively, potentially con-
siderable statutory damages.152  In line with these broad goals of deter-
ring infringement and protecting the copyright holder’s monopoly, 
Congress intended that these damages “compensate the copyright 
owner for losses from the infringement, and . . . prevent the infringer 
from unfairly benefiting from a wrongful act.”153
In addition, Congress, through the remedies provided for in the 
Copyright Act, has expressed a stronger distaste for willful infringe-
ment than for infringements that the copyright holder cannot prove 
were willful.154  And while the Act still wishes to deter even innocent155
infringers, it does so with a considerably lower penalty.156  This aver-
sion to specifically willful infringement must also be accounted for 
when considering retroactive transfers. 
from the exploitation of copyrights will redound to the public benefit by resulting in 
the proliferation of knowledge. . . . The profit motive is the engine that ensures the 
progress of science.”), aff’d, 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994). 
150 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106–122 (2006) (delineating the exclusive rights of copyright 
holders, their scope, and their limitations); see also supra Part II. 
151 See 17 U.S.C. § 106. 
152 See id. § 504(b)–(c) (providing the copyright holder a choice between actual 
and statutory damages).
153 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 161 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5777. 
154 Compare 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (providing for a maximum statutory damage 
award of $150,000 where the court finds the infringement to be willful), with id.
§ 504(c)(1) (providing for a maximum statutory damage award of $30,000 in the case 
of a nonwillful infringement). 
155 An innocent infringer is one who proves that he or she “was not aware and had 
no reason to believe that his or her acts constituted an infringement of copyright.”  17 
U.S.C. § 504(c)(2); H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 163, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 
5779. 
156 See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (providing for a discretionary reduction of the statu-
tory damage award to $200); H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 163, reprinted in 1976 
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5779 (noting that the innocent infringer provision “is sufficient to pro-
tect against unwarranted liability in cases of occasional or isolated innocent infringe-
ment,” and, “by establishing a realistic floor for liability, the provision preserves its in-
tended deterrent effect”).
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Yet discouraging infringement presents only part of the copyright 
story.  Understanding that achieving the optimal public good requires 
that copyrighted works be exposed and actually reach the public, the 
Act also encourages behavior beyond the monopoly provisions.  The 
Act provides, for example, for a fair use exception.157  As a whole, the 
Act and recent copyright case law both attempt to encourage the li-
censing or distribution and dissemination of copyrighted works so 
that the public can benefit from them.158
The introduction of “divisibility” of the rights to a copyrighted 
work in the 1976 Act revisions has been a primary encouragement to-
wards that end.  Under the 1909 Act, the copyright owner had to own 
all the rights associated with the copyright and could not divide them.  
Furthermore, only a copyright proprietor could bring an infringe-
ment action.159  Both of these limitations discouraged licensing by 
making it significantly less valuable; exclusive licensees, for example, 
could not enforce their rights unless complete ownership of the copy-
right had been transferred.  Moreover, copyright owners, knowing 
that they had to convey either all or nothing, tended to give nothing 
away.  Authors, their representatives, and others routinely criticized 
this practice.160  Under amendments made in the 1976 Act, however, 
divisibility became an important feature of copyright law, as “[t]he 
ownership of a copyright may be transferred in whole or in part”161
and “[a]ny of the exclusive rights comprised in a copyright . . . may be 
transferred . . . and owned separately.”162  In addition, exclusive licen-
sees of a particular right became “entitled, to the extent of that right, 
to all of the protection and remedies accorded to the copyright owner 
157 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (“[U]se of a copyrighted work . . . for purposes such as criti-
cism, comment, news reporting, teaching . . . , scholarship, or research, is not an in-
fringement of copyright.”); see also Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure:  A Struc-
tural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV.
1600, 1613 (1982) (arguing that in many cases where “market flaws might preclude 
achievement of desirable consensual exchanges,” courts have excused infringing con-
duct as fair).
158 See, e.g., Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 
(1985) (“By establishing a marketable right to the use of one’s expression, copyright 
supplies the economic incentive to create and disseminate ideas.” (emphasis added)). 
159 See, e.g., Copyright Act of 1909, 17 U.S.C. § 25(b) (repealed 1976). 
160 See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 123, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5738-39 
(noting that the provision in the 1976 Act allowing for divisibility had “long been 
sought by authors and their representatives, and . . . attracted wide support from other 
groups”).
161 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(1). 
162 Id. § 201(d)(2). 
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by this title.”163  Any view on retroactive transfers certainly should not 
lose sight of the congressional goal evinced in these amendments:  
making licenses both more valuable and more willfully exchanged. 
B. Property Law 
Since copyright law also relies on property law to some extent, and 
since courts—such as the Davis v. Blige court—found it relevant to 
look to general property law concepts in ruling on the curative powers 
of retroactive transfers,164 it would be helpful to review relevant real-
property laws.  In addition, we should be mindful of the extent to 
which these property laws should supplement or supplant copyright 
law.165
Copyright law has an explicit connection to property law through 
the legislative history of the Copyright Act.  The House Report to the 
1976 Act indicates that “[u]nder the bill, as under the [1909 Act, as 
amended], coowners of a copyright would be treated generally as ten-
ants in common.”166  Yet this simple indication that the two are related 
is, at best, puzzling.167  There are, however, a number of clear areas of 
copyright law where the influence of tenancy in common is clear:  
joint owners each have equal and undivided rights to use the work;168
joint owners can convey or lease any undivided interest unilaterally; 
joint owners also do not possess the right of survivorship in a fellow 
joint owner’s interest in the work;169 and joint owners have a right to 
an accounting from all profits from the work.170
163 Id.
164 Davis v. Blige, 505 F.3d 90, 99-100 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 117 
(2008).
165 Not all were comfortable with the Davis court’s introduction of New York state 
property law concepts under the circumstances.  See Posting of William Patry to The 
Patry Copyright Blog, supra note 139 (criticizing the Davis court for applying “vener-
able” state law property concepts instead of copyright law). 
166 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 121 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5736. 
167 See Avner D. Sofer, Joint Authorship:  An Uncomfortable Fit with Tenancy in Common,
19 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 1, 2-3 (1998) (noting that Congress has not explained precisely 
how joint authors are to be legally treated as tenants in common, and that, thus far, 
courts have avoided addressing the legal issues of categorizing joint authors as tenants 
in common). 
168 17 U.S.C. §201(a) (2006); 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 6.08.  Tenants 
in common are also said to hold separate and undivided shares of the whole estate. 
169 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 6.09. 
170 Id. § 6.12[A]. 
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Two particular “venerable” property law principles are especially 
relevant here.  The first is that, “while an owner may convey any of his 
rights to others permanently or temporarily, he may not convey more 
than he owns.”171  The second is that, while one cotenant can settle 
her own interest in property, she cannot settle the interests of her co-
tenants; if she settles before the action, the other cotenants can still 
sue.172  It is important to note, however, that unlike in copyright pro-
ceedings now, cotenants traditionally had to join their cotenants when 
bringing an action, though they could afterwards settle individually.173
Applying this principle, the Davis court noted that while a coten-
ant can freely alienate her interest in the co-owned property, she can-
not harm the rights of her cotenants by binding them to “an agree-
ment concerning the use, control, or title to the joint property.”174
This notion seems to be crucial to the Davis court’s theory:  under-
standing that the right to sue for infringement is a co-owner’s right, 
the court viewed another co-owner’s power to extinguish that right 
through a retroactive license or settlement as contrary to that very 
principle. 
C. Contract Law 
Contract law may play a role in this situation for several reasons.  
First, courts have often looked to contract law when resolving many 
issues of joint ownership.175  Second, any retroactive license, whether 
part of a settlement or not, is essentially a contract and purports to 
give parties certain rights; thus, even a cursory contract analysis could 
be beneficial.  As such, the Davis court, for example, sought to estab-
171 Davis v. Blige, 505 F.3d 90, 99 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 117 (2008).
172 See Jackson v. Moore, 87 N.Y.S. 1101, 1103 (N.Y. App. Div. 1904) (“One tenant 
in common can settle for or release his interest in such personal property, but he can-
not settle for or release the interest of his co-tenants.  If one tenant in common should 
settle for his portion of the damages before action, the other may sue without joining 
him.”).
173 See Hill v. Gibbs, 5 Hill 56, 56 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1843) (“As a general rule, tenants 
in common must join in bringing personal actions in which all are interested.”); Jack-
son, 87 N.Y.S at 1103 (citing Hill, 5 Hill at 56).
174 Davis, 505 F.3d at 102 (quoting Wagman v. Carmel, 601 F. Supp. 1012, 1015 
(E.D. Pa. 1985)). 
175 See Sofer, supra note 167, at 2-3 (noting that courts have traditionally avoided 
the issue of joint authors as cotenants, and have instead relied on the “more bright-line 
law of contracts”). 
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lish whether retroactive licenses were consistent with contract law 
principles.176
It is important to understand the contract issues at play.  The basic 
contract law principle implicated by retroactive conveyances is that a 
contract cannot bind one who is not a party to it.177  This principle 
applies as follows:  retroactive transfers are contracts that eliminate 
any cause of action for infringement that the licensing co-owner may 
have had.  In addition, however, such a license would also eliminate 
the causes of action of other co-owners who were not party to the li-
cense.  The Davis court, for example, found that this would effectively 
bind co-owners to the settlement or licensing agreement into which 
the settling or licensing co-owner had entered.178
As I will discuss below, it is not clear how much influence contract 
principles should have under these copyright circumstances.  Never-
theless, because of the obvious ability of one co-owner to affect the in-
terests of another co-owner without the latter’s participation in the li-
censing contract, this principle is relevant. 
D.  Analogizing to Patent Law 
Where copyright law is ambiguous or contested, courts have often 
looked to relevant patent law for support,179 as patent and copyright 
have a “historic kinship”180 and much in common.181  Both patent and 
copyright law, for example, give joint owners equal rights to use the 
work or patented invention without the consent of other co-owners.182
176 See Davis, 505 F.3d at 103 (“Accordingly, we must examine carefully whether 
retroactive licenses and assignments that extinguish a co-owner’s accrued right to sue 
are consistent with the general principles of . . . contract law that underlie the accrual 
and settlement of infringement claims.”). 
177 See, e.g., EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 294 (2002) (“It goes without 
saying that a contract cannot bind a nonparty.”). 
178 Davis, 505 F.3d at 103. 
179 See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 439-40 
(1984) (finding support for vicarious copyright infringement in patent law). 
180 Id. at 439. 
181 Both are forms of intellectual property, and both arise from the same constitu-
tional clause. 
182 Compare 17 U.S.C. § 201(d) (2006) (granting joint owners of a copyright the 
right to exercise their rights independently), with 35 U.S.C. § 262 (2006) (granting the 
same freedom of exercise to joint owners of a patent).  A leading copyright case from 
the nineteenth century relied not only on tenancy-in-common law, but also on patent 
law to find that co-owners of a copyright each have equal rights to use their work with-
out the consent of the other.  See Carter v. Bailey, 64 Me. 458, 464 (1874) (“Such seems 
to be the rule governing owners in common of patent rights; and we think the same 
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The differences between the two, however, indicate that analogies to 
patent practice and law should be undertaken with great care. 
The Federal Circuit has ruled that retroactive licenses granted by 
one co-owner cannot cure past patent infringements, noting that only 
releases can cure prior wrongdoing.183  The Federal Circuit relied 
upon a century-old case, Lalance & Grosjean Manufacturing Co. v. 
Haberman Manufacturing Co., which stated that each co-owner could 
pursue or not pursue her own release independently and the settle-
ment of one would not extinguish the claim of the other; to hold oth-
erwise “would be to push the supposed analogy to the law of real 
property altogether too far.”184
Yet for all the similarities between joint ownership of copyrights 
and patents, there is one crucial difference that militates against ap-
plying the patent rule prohibiting retroactive transfers to our copy-
right case:  patent co-owners do not have any duty to account to one 
another.185  Indeed, a primary reason for the Lalance & Grosjean
court’s holding was that if a joint patent holder elected to settle a 
claim or retroactively license the patent, the other joint holder would 
be hung out to dry.  That is, if one patent co-owner settled without the 
knowledge of the other co-owner, the latter would be left with no law-
suit and no legal way to profit from the infringement, a result the 
Lalance & Grosjean court thought “contrary to natural justice.”186  But 
the nonlicensing or nonsettling copyright co-owner does not suffer so 
principle applicable to the question involved in case of copyright.” (citations omit-
ted)).
183 See Schering Corp. v. Roussel-UCLAF SA, 104 F.3d 341, 345 (Fed. Cir. 1997) 
(“[T]he grant of a license by one co-owner cannot deprive the other co-owner of the 
right to sue for accrued damages for past infringement.  That would require a release, 
not a license, and the rights of a patent co-owner, absent agreement to the contrary, do 
not extend to granting a release that would defeat an action by other co-owners to re-
cover damages for past infringement.”).
184 Lalance & Grosjean Mfg. Co. v. Haberman Mfg. Co., 93 F. 197, 198 
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1899). 
185 See 35 U.S.C. § 262 (“In the absence of any agreement to the contrary, each of 
the joint owners of a patent may make, use, offer to sell, or sell the patented invention 
. . . without accounting to the other owners.”).
186 Lalance & Grosjean Mfg. Co. v. Haberman Mfg. Co. 107 F. 487, 487 
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1901).  The Lalance & Grosjean court stated that “for one of the com-
plainants without the knowledge of the other to settle with the defendants for $20,000 
and refuse to give the other complainant a dollar seems . . . ‘contrary to natural jus-
tice.’”  Id. (quoting In re Horsley & Knighton’s Patent, L.R. 8 Eq. 475, 477 (M.R. 
1869)).
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unjustly where the law provides her with the right to an accounting.187
Any analogy to patent law must therefore account for the absence of 
such protection for patent co-owners. 
IV. UNILATERAL RETROACTIVE TRANSFERS CANNOT 
CURE PRIOR INFRINGEMENTS
Ignited by the Second Circuit’s decision in Davis, many have ar-
gued either that the court should revisit its ruling that retroactive li-
censing by one co-owner does not immunize infringers from in-
fringement actions brought by the other co-owners, or that other 
courts should shy away from this rule.  While these responses are mo-
tivated, at least in part, by the desire for those in the entertainment 
industry to continue the ongoing industry practice of using retroactive 
transfers, there are also strong legal, logical, and policy arguments in 
favor of this practice, as discussed in this section.  Yet these responses 
can only take the argument so far before it must fail in light of all 
relevant considerations. 
A.  Reasons for Allowing Unilateral Retroactive  
Transfers to Cure Prior Infringements 
Particularly with the introduction of divisibility into the Copyright 
Act in 1976,188 Congress has recognized that giving copyright owners 
increased autonomy is an important mechanism for promoting the 
exchange and dissemination of copyrighted works.  Since then, courts 
have often endorsed the increased dissemination of copyrighted 
works.  Courts have responded, for example, by excusing infringe-
ment in cases where, due to market barriers, externalities, or antidis-
semination motives,189 a copyrighted work was not reaching the public 
187 See Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195, 199 (2d Cir. 1998) (describing a 
coowner’s obligation to account); H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 121 (1976), reprinted in
1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5736 (“[E]ach coowner ha[s] an independent right to use or 
license the use of a work, subject to a duty of accounting to the other coowners for any 
profits.”); 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 6.12[A] (“[T]he prevailing rule is that 
a joint owner is under a duty to account to the other joint owners of the work for a rat-
able share of the profits realized from his use of the work.”).  It is not clear, however, 
whether this duty to account, which is now universally accepted, arises out of state or 
federal law. See generally Craig Y. Allison, Note, Does A Copyright Coowner’s Duty To Ac-
count Arise Under Federal Law?, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1998, 2012-33 (1992) (arguing that the 
accounting duty is a federal rule). 
188 See supra notes 159-163 and accompanying text (describing divisibility). 
189 See Gordon, supra note 157, at 1627-35 (discussing the interplay of market fail-
ures and fair use). 
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and, therefore, not fulfilling the primary goal of increasing the public 
welfare.190
The broad precedent that a case like Davis sets, however, seems to 
take a step in the opposite direction.  By limiting a co-owner’s ability 
to make a retroactive conveyance, the court seems to encroach upon 
the right of co-owners to alienate their property and to do so however 
and to whomever they wish.  This is effectively the right that the Copy-
right Act itself gives to them when it states that “[t]he ownership of a 
copyright may be transferred . . . by any means of conveyance.”191
Existing copyright law could be sufficient to resolve this issue:  a 
retroactive transfer is “any means of conveyance,” and one used quite 
commonly at that.  If a retroactive transfer is a means of conveyance, 
then there is no need to resort to either principles of tenancy in com-
mon or contract law.  This reasoning could explain why the courts in 
many of the cases cited in Part III.A did not enter into a protracted 
discussion of the retroactive transfer issue:  if copyright law itself pro-
vides the necessary legal structure for the transaction, while fulfilling 
copyright law’s goals of public dissemination and rewarding the au-
thor, then no further discussion is necessary. 
Any concern that retroactive transfers would yield unfair exploita-
tion of the work at the expense of the other co-owner could be miti-
gated by copyright law’s protection of co-owners through the duty to 
account.192  Thus, a co-owner who grants a retroactive license or 
reaches a settlement with the infringer does not reap all the profits 
from such conveyances herself:  she must split them with her co-
owners in proportion to their ownership.  This accounting, one may 
argue, can compensate a co-owner for her contribution just as copy-
right protection intends.  Furthermore, this accounting and compen-
190 See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) 
(“[I]t is Congress that has been assigned the task of defining the scope of the limited 
monopoly that should be granted to authors or to inventors in order to give the public 
appropriate access to their work product.”). 
191 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(1) (2006) (emphasis added). 
192 See supra note 187 and accompanying text (discussing the obligation to ac-
count); cf. GEORGE D. CARY, STUDY NO. 13: JOINT OWNERSHIP OF COPYRIGHTS (1958), 
reprinted in U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, GENERAL REVISION OF THE COPYRIGHT LAW 12-17, 
at 33-34 (1959) (“The relatively recent development of the accounting principle pro-
vided a brake upon the unbridled ambition of a co-owner who might be inclined to 
disregard the rights of his colleagues and at the same time served a useful purpose in 
permitting an energetic co-owner the right to profit from his original labor . . . 
whether or not his other co-owners joined with him.”).
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sation, which is not present in the patent context,193 makes up for the 
fact that the co-owner can no longer sue for infringement.194
Another goal of copyright litigation would also be furthered 
through the duty to account:  even when infringement has taken place 
and litigation has been initiated, courts may still wish to encourage 
settlements, understanding that parties can often value the exploita-
tion themselves.195  If a single co-owner could retroactively authorize 
the prior infringement instead of requiring each individual co-owner 
to come forward, the litigation would certainly be prone to quicker 
settlement. 
Additional concerns of the potential for “legal mischief”196—such
that one co-owner could end ongoing litigation that another co-owner 
has brought—can be allayed, at least in part, by comparison to pro-
spective licensing.  The right of one co-owner to grant a prospective 
license to a third party, even when another co-owner does not wish to 
do so, is an undisputed right of joint ownership.  It has been part and 
parcel of our joint-ownership jurisprudence since well before the 
modern copyright statute.197  Perhaps it is just too bad that the nonset-
tling co-owner’s infringement suit must fail, as the settling co-owner 
was merely acting on a right incident to copyright ownership.  This 
notion builds on a point raised by the Venegas-Hernandez court:  “The 
granting of a retroactive license implies that the retroactive licensor 
had the requisite ownership and, therefore, authority to make such a 
193 See supra Part III.D. 
194 Cf. Copyright.net Music Publ’g LLC v. MP3.com, No. 01-7321, 2003 WL 
740757, at *1 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 4, 2003) (“[W]hile the co-owners are precluded from 
suing MP3.com, they may proceed in an accounting action against the settling HFA-
Releasors.”).  There are other theories examining the basis for the accounting rule.  See
Vern G. Davidson, Comment, Entertainment Law:  Problems in Co-Ownership of Copyrights,
8 UCLA L. REV. 1035, 1044 (citing precedent for at least four theories on which to base 
the duty to account). 
195 See ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 722 F.2d 988, 997 (2d Cir. 
1983) (“As a general matter, we note first that courts favor the policy of encouraging 
voluntary settlement of disputes.”).  Of course, courts have their own additional mo-
tives for encouraging settlements in all litigation.
196 Davis v. Blige, 505 F.3d 90, 102, 105-06 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 117 
(2008).
197 See, e.g., Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 221 F.2d 569, 570 
(2d Cir. 1955) (describing the assignment of rights to publish a jointly owned song), 
modified on other grounds, 223 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1955); Meredith v. Smith, 145 F.2d 620, 
621 (9th Cir. 1944) (“It is not questioned that . . . [a] co-owner of the copyright would 
have had the right to give permission . . . to publish the book.”); see also discussion, in-
fra note 201. 
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grant at the time the infringement occurred.”198  That is, if the co-
owner could have authorized the infringement when it occurred—
even over the most strenuous objections of a co-owner—what differ-
ence does it make to allow her simply to authorize the infringement 
now?  The nonsettling co-owner would not be able to sue now, just as 
she would not have been able to sue then. 
Thus, the problem may exist in the tenet of joint ownership that 
allows for unilateral actions but not with retroactive transfers in par-
ticular.199  Indeed, the district court in Davis noted that its decision 
might seem draconian expressly because “a co-owner has a legal right 
to grant a license in a work without another co-owner’s permission or 
to transfer his rights in the copyright freely.”200  While it may be com-
pelling to suggest an alternative to the practice of unilateral action, it 
would clearly run contrary to U.S. copyright law and likely stifle public 
dissemination.201
198 Venegas-Hernandez v. Peer, Nos. 01-1215, 2004 WL 3686337, at *33 (D.P.R. 
May 19, 2004), aff’d in part, rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Venegas-Hernández v. Aso-
ciación De Compositores y Editores de Música Latinoamericana (ACEMLA), 424 F.3d 
50 (1st Cir. 2005).
199 Cf. supra text accompanying notes 34-37 (discussing the tension between exclu-
sivity of copyrights and joint ownership). 
200 Davis v. Blige, 419 F. Supp. 2d 493, 500 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), rev’d on other grounds,
505 F.3d 90 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 117 (2008).
201 The negative effects of permitting unilateral actions by joint owners were well 
known leading up to the 1976 Copyright Act.  See, e.g., Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., 221 
F.2d at 570 (describing a situation where two coowners attempted to separately license 
their work to the same third party at different fees); CARY, supra note 192, at 33-34 
(“One defect in this approach . . . is that it permits co-owners to compete against each 
other, with the normal result that both may suffer financially.”).  Bars on unilateral ac-
tions by joint owners are, in fact, popular in Europe.  The English rule developed such 
that all coowners of a work had to consent before the work could be exploited.  See
Cescinsky v. George Routledge & Sons, Ltd., (1916) 2 K.B. 325, 330 (“[A] reproduc-
tion without the consent of all the owners is an infringement . . . .”); Powell v. Head, 
(1879) 12 Ch. D. 686, 687 (granting an injunction and damages to nonconsenting 
coowners); CARY, supra note 192, at 33.  This is also the rule in France, the Republic of 
Korea, Austria, Italy, and Sweden.  See CARY, supra note 192, at 23; JULIE E. COHEN ET 
AL., COPYRIGHT IN A GLOBAL INFORMATION ECONOMY 134 (2002).  Congress consid-
ered the merits of switching to the English system in the course of revising copyright 
law prior to enacting the 1976 Act; when various copyright experts were asked for their 
advice, only one (Professor Melville Nimmer) favored following the English system.  See
Letter from Melville B. Nimmer to the U.S. Copyright Office (Sept. 15, 1958), in COM-
MENTS AND VIEWS SUBMITTED TO THE COPYRIGHT OFFICE ON JOINT OWNERSHIP OF 
COPYRIGHTS (1958), reprinted in U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, GENERAL REVISION OF THE 
COPYRIGHT LAW 12-17, at 5 (1959) (“I would rather adopt the unitary standard sug-
gested whereby the consent of all co-owners is required for use or license of the 
work.”).  Some have argued that since global copyright licensing often requires the 
approval of all joint authors before a work can be exploited, adopting this system 
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B. The Necessary Solution:  Unilateral Retroactive Transfers  
Cannot Cure Prior Infringements 
The foregoing arguments are compelling, but their deficiencies 
indicate that, on balance, the simplistic interpretation of copyright 
practice and law alone is insufficient to actually further the goals of 
copyright law.  For the following reasons, courts should not permit 
unilateral retroactive conveyances to cure prior infringement. 
First, and most importantly, in the problem at hand the in-
fringer’s use of the work was unequivocally unauthorized at the time 
of exploitation.  Any attempt to “cure” that infringement must recog-
nize that the nonlicensing or nonsettling co-owners’ infringement 
claim already accrued.  While the Copyright Act is silent as to when 
exactly a claim accrues,202 courts have held that infringement claims 
accrue either on the date of the infringement (the injury rule) or on 
the date the infringement is discovered by the copyright holder (the 
discovery rule).203  Under either accrual determination method, how-
ever, the result is the same:  the injury occurs on the date of the third 
party’s unauthorized exploitation, that is, when the copyright holder’s 
exclusive right was violated.  Since, in our situation, the copyright 
holder’s exclusive right was violated, she has a cause of action for 
copyright infringement, itself a vested right belonging to a copyright 
holder.204
While the Copyright Act does allow a copyright co-owner to use 
her jointly owned work in any way authorized by the Act unilaterally, it 
does not provide a way for one copyright co-owner to divest another 
co-owner of vested rights.  Reference to basic property and contract 
law principles can fill this void, as Congress intended,205 and indicate 
that a settlement or retroactive transfer by one co-owner should not 
would better align U.S. copyright practice with the current practical realities of global 
copyright licensing.  See Self, supra note 10, at 75.
202 See 17 U.S.C. § 507(b) (2006) (stating only that “[n]o civil action shall be main-
tained under the provisions of this title unless it is commenced within three years after 
the claim accrued,” but not specifying when accrual occurs).
203 See Auscape Int’l v. Nat’l Geographic Soc’y, 409 F. Supp. 2d 235, 242-48 
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (acknowledging that courts are split as to whether accrual of copyright 
infringement claims follows the injury or discovery rule and concluding that, based on 
the legislative history of the Copyright Act, the injury rule is proper). 
204 See Silvers v. Sony Pictures Entm’t, Inc., 402 F.3d 881, 890 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005) 
(finding that an accrued right to sue for infringement belongs to the copyright 
holder).
205 See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 121, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5736. 
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bind other co-owners and divest them of their accrued rights under 
the Copyright Act. 
In addition, incorporation of these principles allows the goals of 
copyright predictability to be fulfilled.206  It also makes it easy to avoid 
the problem encountered by the Venegas-Hernandez court, which is 
likely to be encountered in the future.  The Venegas-Hernandez court, 
as mentioned above, found that a party, believing it was a co-owner of 
a copyright, could be held liable for contributory infringement (i.e., 
inducing a 1993 infringement) for issuing a retroactive license to an 
infringing party in 1998.207  While the First Circuit pointed out the 
complications of such a holding,208 contributory infringement claims 
are alleged with increasing frequency in copyright lawsuits.209  The ex-
treme factual uncertainty as to whether a particular act was or was not 
authorized and the ability to revise past facts will only make such para-
206 See, e.g., Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 749 (1989) 
(“Congress’ paramount goal in revising the 1976 Act . . . [was] enhancing predictabil-
ity and certainty of copyright ownership.” (citing H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 129, re-
printed in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5745)); see also Davis v. Blige, 505 F.3d 90, 104-05 (2d 
Cir. 2007) (listing “the need for predictability and certainty” as one “strong reason[] 
for disfavoring” retroactive licenses), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 117 (2008).
207 Venegas-Hernandez v. Peer, Nos. 01-1215, 2004 WL 3686337, at *33-34 (D.P.R. 
May 19, 2004), aff’d in part, rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Venegas-Hernández v. Aso-
ciación De Compositores y Editores de Música Latinoamericana (ACEMLA), 424 F. 3d 
50 (1st Cir. 2005). 
208 See Venegas-Hernández v. Asociación De Compositores y Editores de Música 
Latinoamericana (ACEMLA), 424 F.3d 50, 59-60 (1st Cir. 2005) (“[O]bviously a license 
in 1998 did not ‘cause’ a 1993 infringement.”). 
209 See, e.g., MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 918-19 (2005) (ad-
dressing a contributory-infringement claim based upon peer-to-peer file-sharing pro-
gram); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 434-35 (1984) 
(recognizing a cause of action for contributory infringement). 
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doxical complications like Venegas-Hernandez210 all the more likely and 
allow for absurd claims.211
Second, while a nonsettling or nonlicensing co-owner would not 
be left with no profit, the accounting remedy would be inadequate 
compensation for an accrued infringement claim.  Indeed, the non-
settling or nonlicensing co-owner may have to initiate suit against the 
settling co-owner and prove the latter’s profits to receive her share of 
those profits.  Those profits, however, are the licensing co-owner’s 
profits from licensing, not the infringer’s profits from infringing the 
copyright.  A copyright holder whose copyright has been infringed is 
also entitled to the infringer’s profits,212 but she could not receive 
them in any accounting proceeding, nor could she receive any dam-
ages she suffered as a result of the infringement, to which she is also 
entitled.213
210 For a case that proposed a similar complication and could have posed serious 
problems if past ownership were a malleable fact, see Vasquez v. Torres-Negron, No. 
06-619, 2007 WL 2244784, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 11, 2007), in which the defendant (who 
earlier had made an allegedly unauthorized derivative of plaintiffs’ work) allegedly in-
fringed plaintiffs’ copyright by copyrighting his allegedly derivative work and suing—
and eventually settling with—others for infringing his copyright.  The plaintiffs claimed 
that the defendant’s settlements constituted a form of indirect copyright infringement 
in that they contributed to or made the defendant vicariously liable for further in-
fringement upon the plaintiffs’ original work.  Id. at *11.  The court noted that 
“[c]ontrary to plaintiffs’ creative but incorrect contention, Torres could neither have 
exercised any control over the unauthorized publication of Noche de Fiesta by virtue of 
the settlements nor induced any unauthorized actions by the record companies.”  Id. at *12.
211 See, e.g., Davis, 505 F.3d at 106 n.14 (“[I]nfringers who obtained a retroactive 
transfer of a copyright interest could not only grant retroactive licenses but also sue 
other past infringers of the copyright.  These retroactive co-owners could then issue ret-
roactive licenses to these other past infringers, thwarting yet other potential infringe-
ment suits by a non-licensing co-owner.”); see also Self, supra note 10, at 74 (noting the 
problematic result that retroactive licensees could be placed “on footing equal to or 
even greater than that of law-abiding licensees”).  In addition, predictability may also 
be sacrificed when, as is not uncommon, the (co)ownership of a copyright is con-
tested. See, e.g., Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500, 505-06 (2d Cir. 1991) (considering 
whether a contributor to a work ought to be considered a coowner of the work).  If 
retroactive transfers were given curative power in such a situation, a coowner pursuing 
an infringement action may believe that she alone owns the copyright, only to have her 
claim disappear when the infringer is able to discover a contributor or other person 
who can now claim co-ownership and then settle with that newly discovered co-owner.  
See, e.g., supra Part II.A.4 (discussing Silberstein v. Fox Entm’t Group, Inc., 424 F. Supp. 
2d 616, 620-22 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)). 
212 17 U.S.C. § 504(b) (2006) (“The copyright owner is entitled to recover . . . any 
profits of the infringer that are attributable to the infringement . . . .”). 
213 Id. (“The copyright owner is entitled to recover the actual damages suffered by 
him or her as a result of the infringement . . . .”).
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As the Davis court failed to note, however, a co-owner’s share of 
the licensing co-owner’s profits, while probably not as great as the in-
fringer’s actual profits from the infringing use, may be the approxi-
mate amount to which she would be entitled had a co-owner originally 
licensed the work before the infringer exploited it.  That is, if the li-
censing co-owner had actually given a prospective license to a third 
party (thereby authorizing the use in advance), the nonlicensing co-
owner would still only be entitled to her share of the licensing fee, not 
the third-party user’s profits. 
Yet, in the context of a pending infringement suit, the retroactive 
license or settlement costs would not be identical to a license in the 
prospective licensing context.  While prospective licensing fees are 
typically bargained for with a view towards the rates of similar li-
censes,214 settlements are bargained for against a backdrop of un-
known damages that a judge or jury may award, as well as the costs of 
continued litigation.215  In addition, should the copyrighted work be 
unique, prospective licensors could bargain for a very favorable licens-
ing agreement, knowing that any licensee could not acquire an ade-
quate substitute.216  This upper hand would be lost in the settlement 
or retroactive licensing context, where the infringement has already 
taken place and the copyright holders can form only a retroactive li-
cense against a backdrop of uncertain and discretionary damage 
awards.217
An accounting would be even more insufficient if the actual dam-
ages to the copyright holders were insignificant.  Since a retroactive 
license would foreclose the litigation option for the nonlicensing co-
owner (and limit her to an accounting), she could not opt to receive 
statutory damages in lieu of actual damages and profits, which, under 
the discretion of the district court, could range from $200 to $150,000 
214 See AL KOHN & BOB KOHN, KOHN ON MUSIC LICENSING 554, 1406-17 (2d ed. 
1996) (discussing factors affecting license fees and listing typical licensing fees). 
215 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 504–505 (allowing remedies for actual damages, profits, statu-
tory damages, attorneys’ fees, and potential double penalties); Self, supra note 10, at 74 
(characterizing the uncertainty as “enormous” given variability in damages and “noto-
riously broad” judicial discretion). 
216 See KOHN & KOHN, supra note 214, at 554-57 (discussing factors that affect the 
value of a song); Self, supra note 10, at 74 (analyzing factors affecting copyright settle-
ment negotiations).  This could cause significant conflict among co-owners over 
whether to settle or continue litigating in the hope that the damages awarded would 
be high.  A retroactive transfer would effectively allow one dissenting co-owner to de-
cide for the rest of her co-owners. 
217 See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (providing a range for statutory damage awards). 
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per infringement.218  The same could be said when the licensing co-
owner settles the claim or grants a retroactive license for a paltry sum; 
again, the nonlicensing co-owner would be forced to settle for her 
share of that sum rather than suing for potentially more substantial 
statutory damages.  The co-owner’s right to elect statutory damages 
vests when the infringement claim accrues; permitting retroactive 
transfers to abrogate this vested right on the notion that an account-
ing would suffice neglects these considerations. 
Third, giving curative power to retroactive licenses would likely 
encourage, rather than discourage, infringement—a clear antithesis 
to Copyright Act’s goal of exclusive-rights protection.  Infringement 
would be encouraged primarily because an infringer—faced with the 
threat of high statutory damages in an infringement suit—has the op-
tion to pay her way out of the suit by obtaining a retroactive license 
from only one co-owner, perhaps one that is not even a party to the 
action and willing to settle for less than the suing co-owner would 
be.219  To be sure, the settling (or license-granting) co-owner could 
hold out for a higher settlement (or licensing fee), if she is even aware 
that she is settling on behalf of all co-owners.  And while there may 
not always be a co-owner willing to settle or grant a retroactive license 
at a bargain to the infringer, the infringer will at worst face the same 
threat of court-awarded damages.  Allowing unilateral retroactive li-
censes, however, allows for the infringer to find a cheaper way to in-
fringe that otherwise would not exist.220
Such incentives, moreover, would specifically encourage willful in-
fringement, for which the Copyright Act evinces a strong aversion.221
If a potential infringer believes that it should not matter whether she 
receives authorization before or after she exploits a jointly owned 
copyrighted work, she would be more likely to proceed with authori-
zation than if it were not possible to receive retroactive authorization.  
There is no guarantee that she would be able to receive authorization.  
Under the Davis rule, however, potential infringers are faced with the 
218 Id.
219 See Davis v. Blige, 505 F.3d 90, 106 n.14 (noting that retroactive transfers could 
thwart infringement suits). 
220 Of course, that cheaper option would be available ex ante in the form of an 
ordinary prospective license from a coowner who grants a license at a low fee.  Such a 
situation, however, is not discouraged by the Copyright Act, but expressly encouraged.  
17 U.S.C. § 201(d). 
221 See supra text accompanying notes 154-156 (noting that the Copyright Act pun-
ishes willful infringement with harsher penalties than it does with nonwillful infringe-
ment).
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threat of continued litigation and penalties for infringement on the 
one hand, or settling with each and every co-owner of the copyrighted 
work on the other.  Neither choice is appealing, and the latter is espe-
cially unattractive—probably so unattractive that any potential in-
fringer would likely make every effort to obtain a license before using 
the work. 
Furthermore, the circumstances of retroactive licenses are not 
necessarily such that the market has failed and the work, but for a ret-
roactive license, would not reach the public.222  Since, after all, one of 
the co-owners was willing to license the work retroactively instead of 
litigating to judgment, it is unlikely that each of the co-owners was 
unwilling to license the work ex ante.  Thus, the threat of market fail-
ure is not so strong as to warrant excusing past infringements (or re-
garding them as cured) in order to increase public dissemination.  
This solution, since it still permits a co-owner to grant a license pro-
spectively without the consent of her co-owners, should not have the 
effect of stifling dissemination of works;223 rather, it should promote 
the timely acquisition of licenses. 
Accordingly, allowing one joint owner to settle or retroactively li-
cense a copyrighted work so as to extinguish a co-owner’s right to sue 
for infringement would not further the goals of the Copyright Act.  
Instead, such curative retroactive licenses appear to make infringe-
ment less costly, thus promoting the unauthorized exploitation of 
copyrighted works. 
CONCLUSION
The rights incident to joint ownership of copyright certainly do 
not fit comfortably with the notion of the exclusivity of these rights.  
222 See supra text accompanying notes 157-158 & 188 (explaining how copyright 
law provides the incentive to disseminate works). 
223 Cf. Letter from Edward A. Sargoy to the Copyright Office, (Oct. 24, 1958), in
COMMENTS AND VIEWS SUBMITTED TO THE COPYRIGHT OFFICE ON JOINT OWNERSHIP OF 
COPYRIGHTS, supra note 201, at 10, reprinted in U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, GENERAL REVI-
SION OF THE COPYRIGHT LAW 12-17 (1959) (asserting that “the bringing of works to 
public attention and enjoyment would . . . be stifled” if joint owners could not license 
the work without the consent of their coowners).  There is an argument that this solu-
tion may have the opposite effect and stifle public dissemination of works.  While there 
may be such an incremental effect, the only basis for this argument is that “a little in-
fringement is a good thing.”  Courts, however, are largely unwilling to endorse such a 
view in the absence of a market failure.  See Gordon, supra note 157, at 1627-33 (noting 
that courts are more likely to find fair use than infringement where market bargains 
are unavailable).
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Since each co-owner has the ability to exploit or to authorize an ex-
ploitation of a copyrighted work without the consent of her co-owners, 
there will be circumstances where one co-owner acts against the wishes 
of her co-owners.  For the most part, copyright law protects unwilling 
co-owners, particularly through the duty to account. 
The legal fiction of a retroactive transfer of authorization serves 
only the purpose of cutting short a lawsuit for infringement that has 
already been committed and that a nonauthorizing co-owner has a 
right to prosecute.  The accounting remedy proves insufficient in such 
a situation—the Copyright Act entitles a co-owner to more, in the 
hopes of preventing infringement and encouraging the development 
and dissemination of creative works.  The Copyright Act references 
the laws of tenancy in common and contract law, and recourse to 
these areas of law can illuminate much about the rights and duties 
that co-owners owe each other.  Both of these areas of law, as well as 
the underlying goals of the Copyright Act, support the conclusion that 
retroactive transfers should not be able to cure prior infringement. 
The traditional ability of a copyright owner to license a work how-
ever she pleases may make this tough to swallow for some in the enter-
tainment industry, where joint ownership is a common companion to 
the creation of works.  Yet since the vested copyrights of a co-owner 
would be eliminated and the goals of the Copyright Act compromised, 
unilateral retroactive transfers should not be allowed to cure prior 
infringing acts. 
